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Abstract 
 
Continuous growth in Islamic finance calls for studying the framework in which the monetary policy 
maker (i.e., central bank) performs its functions. Central banks in Muslim countries are using various 
instruments for monetary policy purpose including interest rate. As a result, Islamic financial 
institutions (IFIs) are facing issues in benchmarking the price of financial instruments. Acceptable 
solution to benchmarking lies in the presence of a real economic activity in the base of any proposal 
and its feasibility for business performance when put against conventional banking. This paper 
presents empirical evidence of statistical equivalence of nominal GDP growth rate and official interest 
rate for ‘advanced,’ ‘all,’ and some Muslim countries. We propose nominal GDP growth rate as 
benchmark for pricing domestic financial transactions of IFIs as well as for pricing external bilateral/ 
multilateral loans. The paper also suggests nominal income targeting as monetary policy regime and 
provides a liquidity management mechanism for banking system in Islamic financial environment.   
Keywords:  Islamic Finance; Central Bank; Interest Rate; Nominal Income Targeting. Liquidity 
Management 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Islamic finance has grown strong particularly during the last 50 years in various parts 
of the world including Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sudan etc and 
in some non Muslim countries (like China, UK). However, little attention has been 
paid to the framework in which the monetary policy maker and conductor (i.e., the 
central bank) performs its functions. Resultantly, despite tremendous growth in 
Islamic financial services, Islamic financial institutions are faced with issues that 
prove hurdles in their functioning to their own satisfaction and to the satisfaction of 
their customers. One such hurdle is the non-availability of acceptable benchmark 
price for Islamic financial instruments. It is currently linked to the price of 
conventional instruments (like KIBOR in the case of Pakistan). This paper reviews 
available literature on central banking in Islamic financial environment and the 
practice followed by central banks for liquidity management and monetary 
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management in countries where Islamic banking is prevalent. With the help of easily 
available data and based on a simple statistical test, the paper proposes a benchmark 
for pricing domestic financial transactions as well as international 
bilateral/multilateral and institutional arrangements like with IMF and World Bank. It 
also suggests a monetary policy regime for central banks compliant with Islamic 
principles.   
 
2. Literature Review  
 
In literature, relevant to the role and functions of central bank and monetary 
management based on Islamic ideas, we find concepts such as refinance ratio 
(Siddique, 1982), qard-e-hasnah ratio (Khan, 1982), Mudarabah based lending 
between commercial and central banks and restricting high powered money by way of 
required reserve ratio than relying on OMO (Chapra, 1983), composite stock 
(Zangeneh & Salam, 1993) and central bank having equity stake in commercial banks 
(Uzair, 1982) to name a few. None has challenged the monetary policy regime within 
which central banks operate to purify the central bank from use of interest rate. As a 
result, central banks in Muslim countries are following interest related monetary 
policy regimes and Islamic commercial banks have been facing problem pertaining to 
benchmark price; like price of Islamic financial instruments in Pakistan are linked to 
KIBOR (Karachi Interbank Offered Rate) which is basically a pricing benchmark for 
conventional banking.  
 
Kurrihara (1951) asserts that if a central bank is the government's bank, then, if 
government sells securities to the central bank, interest paid by the government will 
eventually come back to the government without economic or payoff difference. A 
number of Shariah scholars hold this view. But to some scholars interest is prohibited 
in absolute sense and it cannot be accommodated even if the same transaction is 
reversed over a period of time and thereby nullifying the economic impact. 
Furthermore, during the financial repression, governments around the world had been 
manipulating remuneration in favor of fiscal authorities while selling securities to 
central banks. And that had always been easy for governments because they had not 
to record (with central banks) economic activities for such transactions.  
 
Chapra (1983) realizing that the two important instruments of monetary policy in the 
capitalist economy, discount rate and OMO in interest-bearing government securities 
will not be available, recommended following measures: (i) central bank should make 
the reserve money, created by it, available partly to the government and partly to the 
commercial banks and the specialized financial institutions; (ii) a proportion of 
commercial banks’ demand deposits (say 25 percent) should be diverted to the 
government to enable it to finance socially beneficial projects in which profit-sharing 
is not feasible and the government would pay service charges to the commercial 
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banks for their deposit mobilization services; (iii) commercial banks should be 
required to hold a certain proportion (say 10-20 percent) of their time and demand 
liabilities with the central bank as statutory reserves and the central bank should pay 
the commercial banks the cost of mobilizing these deposits just as the government 
would pay the cost of mobilizing demand deposits diverted to the government.   
Siddiqui (1982) supported the use of "refinance ratio", i.e., central bank refinancing a 
part of the interest-free loans provided by commercial banks to influence the volume 
of short term credit extended by commercial banks.  
Khan (1982) advocated the use of qard-e-hasnah ratio, i.e., the percentage of demand 
deposits that commercial banks are obliged to lend as an interest free loan to 
influence the availability of credit.  
Uzair (1982) proposed that a central bank can acquire equity stake in commercial 
banking by holding 25 percent of the capital stocks of the commercial banks to get a 
permanent source of income and play its role as a lender of last resort. However, his 
proposal can cause conflict of interest between regulator and private banking 
institutions.  
Along with other suggestions Zangeneh and Ahmad (1993) presented an alternative 
to money management. They recommended that the central bank could charge the 
borrowing bank a weighted average rate of return in different sectors of the economy. 
This will create problems with reference to choice of sectors to calculate the weighted 
average rate of return. A particular bank may not have any investment in certain 
sector(s). Furthermore, this suggestion does not solve all the problems pertaining to 
pricing of products in Islamic finance. Reddy (2001) highlighted an important 
problem in an Islamic economy as to how it will deal with external debt management 
which is primarily interest based.  
Khan (2004) argued against elimination of interest by a legal decree and favored free 
market forces to bring the interest rates down to zero4. He emphasized on providing 
incentives for the use of equity over debt financing. He proposed following policy 
measures: i) reducing reserve requirements to increase supply of loanable funds; ii) 
enforcing unlimited liability; iii) gradual decline in interest to make investments in 
debt based instruments less lucrative and shift loanable funds towards equity based 
instruments; iv) allowing dividend as a tax deductible expense; and v) providing 
fiscal incentives to non-leveraged firms and disincentives to leveraged firms.  
                                                 
4 As a result of which no one will be saving (for lending purpose) rather will be using  saved money for equity 
share holding.  
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3. Existing Practices in Muslim Countries  
In almost all the Muslim countries a combination of various policy instruments is 
used for monetary policy purpose including; a) Minimum Reserve Requirement; b) 
Open Market Operations, and c) Discount Rate. For example, the monetary policy of 
Saudi Monetary Agency (SAMA) relies primarily on variations in the reserve ratio 
requirements. A significant secondary tool is selective credit controls which include 
regulation of credit ceilings, cash margins, terms and conditions of customer 
transactions, limits, prohibitions on specific categories of loans, and fixing the assets 
to be held within the Kingdom by each bank. SAMA also uses its own accounts and 
government deposits with commercial banks to regulate the money supply. But again 
SAMA uses ORR (Official Repo Rate) for short term liquidity management.  
In some countries there are some special arrangements for Islamic financial 
transactions. Such countries include Sudan and Malaysia.  Central bank of Sudan 
provides financial support to the Islamic banks facing liquidity problems through 
purchasing financial papers “Sukuks” from them. In Malaysia various types of 
instruments are in use including Bank Negara Monetary Notes-i (BNMN-i). Malaysia 
has sophisticated array of Islamic finance products. However, the prevalent use of 
Bai-al-Dayn (Sale of Debt) and Bai-Inaah (Buy Back) is not recommended by many 
Islamic scholars and hence it warrants us to look for better alternatives compliant 
with Islamic principles.  
            
Operational side of monetary management is relatively better developed in countries 
like Pakistan and Malaysia. In Pakistan two interbank trading agreements – the 
Interbank Musharakah and Interbank Wakalah – are being used as standard contracts 
in the Islamic finance industry. The Islamic interbank market is in the process to 
replace the KIBOR, with the Islamic Interbank Offered Rate (IIBOR), and offer an 
avenue for Islamic banks to lend excess funds to each other5. Interbank Musharakah 
is a short term restricted partnership where the banks are invited to invest amount in a 
special pool of assets on a pre-agreed profit sharing ratio agreed upon at the outset. 
Interbank Wakalah is an investment management contract whereby the investor 
agrees to provide the Islamic bank with funds to invest in different assets. The Islamic 
bank acts as the investor’s agent and is paid a service based fee. In Malaysia, the 
Islamic Inter bank Money Market (IIMM) was introduced in 1990s as a short-term 
intermediary to provide a ready source of short-term investment outlets based on 
Shariah principles. Through the IIMM, the Islamic banks and banks participating in 
the Islamic Banking Scheme (IBS) match the funding requirements effectively and 
efficiently.  
 
                                                 
5 It is feared that conceptually it will not be much different from KIBOR. 
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Some of the alternatives relevant to money market and liquidity needs established and 
used in Islamic banking includes: a) Bai Salam in Bill Discounting; b) Running 
Musharakah; c) Tijara for Short Term Liquidity Management; d) Treasury Financing 
by way of Short Term Investment through Pool Management; e) Treasury 
Investments by way of Short Term Investment through Commodity Murabaha; f) 
Shariah Compliant Asset Backed Securitization like Sukuks. But benchmarking the 
return is crucial issue in most of the cases to get approval from Shariah Boards.  
 
4. Benchmark Price for the Islamic Financial Instruments   
 
Solution to the benchmarking the price of Islamic financial instruments rests in the 
presence of real economic activity in the base of any proposal and its feasibility for 
business performance in the presence of conventional banking. To find such a 
solution the paper marries two ideas: one found in Islamic economics literature where 
Usmani (2003) referred to the proposal of linking extra remuneration of instruments 
of public finance to the GDP growth rate and other found in contemporary economic 
wisdom where we see gap between nominal GDP growth rate and official interest rate 
as the monetary policy stance [Economist (2007)6].  Following Economist (2007) we 
have shown in figure 1 that (average) official interest rate and (average) nominal 
GDP growth rate moves along based on available data for Canada, 16 major Euro 
area countries, Japan, US, and UK7 for 1970-2008.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Economist (2007) has used a figure showing the gap between nominal GDP growth and official interest rate of 
big economies (America, Britain, Canada, China, the euro area, India and Japan) for period 1970 to 2007 (and 
forecasts for 2008) as an indicator of monetary policy stance. The decline (rise) in positive gaps shows tight 
(loose) monetary policy.  
7 These account for 64 per cent of world GDP.  
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Is this phenomenon true only for advanced countries? Not all countries use similar 
type of policy rates. There can be different monetary policy regimes in different 
countries. From the latest available International Financial Statistics of International 
Monetary Fund we collected nominal GDP growth rate and official policy (interest) 
rate. We find only 125 such countries for which consistent data series were available 
for both the variables. Based upon the standard deviation of the nominal income 
growth series (for each country) we dropped the top 20 percent highly volatile 
countries and plotted in figure 2 the average official interest rate and nominal GDP 
growth rate of remaining 100 countries (for list see Table 2 of Appendix) for 1981-
2008. The behaviour of the two variables for a larger set of countries is not different 
from those of advanced economies shown in figure 1.   
 
 
 
In addition to the above visual analysis the study has also tested if the means of these 
two series are statistically equal. Table 1, has the results of the test of equality of 
means of these two series. For advance countries group (Canada, 16 major Euro area 
countries, Japan, US, and UK), for 100 countries group, and a set of Muslim countries 
(Bahrain, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen) the 
null hypothesis could not be rejected as the means of nominal income growth and 
official policy interest rate are equal except in the case of Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Malaysia and Pakistan. Selection of those Muslim countries for analysis where 
Islamic finance practices are more prevalent was deliberate. Looking at the graph 
above and the results of the test conducted we propose (expected) annual NGDPGR 
(announced by central government body like planning commission) to be used as 
benchmark for Islamic finance products of assets side8. Products on liabilities side 
                                                 
8 For the two groups of countries (‘advanced’ as well as ‘all’ 100 for those relevant consistent data series were 
available) we have also tested and found variances of the official policy rate and nominal GDP growth rate to be 
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can be priced based upon the difference between NGDPGR and the cost of deposit 
mobilisation. For the purpose of saving depositors from deprivation of minimum 
returns central banks can come up with some regulatory measures. One such example 
could be to ensure that IFIs pay at least half of the expected nominal GDP growth rate 
as remunerations to depositors. This will keep spread in check and force IFIs to keep 
their expenses reasonable. Nominal GDP and interest rate are conceptually different 
in the sense that following the later is haram and the former is not forbidden.  
 
At present in most of the countries quarterly (year on year) growth in GDP is released 
by the relevant statistical agencies. Monthly release of such figures is a demanding 
task and only projections are available and that, too, not for all countries. Countries 
where such figures are released less frequently (like Pakistan) things are heading 
right. An important question arises with reference to yield curve (relation between 
return and time to maturity of contract). For short period of time the rates can be 
settled on the basis of projections for monthly NGDPGR, expected quarterly 
NGDPGR and expected annual NGDPGR announced by the government body. For 
longer periods than one year contracts can be based upon projected NGDPGR in 
governments’ medium to long term plans and accounts can be settled / reconciled 
later on the basis of realized NGDPGR of the economy9.  
 
Is benchmarking Islamic financial instrument to NGDPGR superior to conventional 
measure of monetary policy stance? Yes. To understand this, a visit to the literature in 
monetary economics is must. If the gap between nominal GDP growth rate and 
interest rate is a monetary policy stance then the proposal makes the nominal GDP 
growth rate a policy stance and thus policy remains neutral – neither tight nor loose10. 
Central banks in Islamic countries can use nominal income targeting as monetary 
policy regime11. Furthermore, it gives incentive to lender to oversee the use of lent 
money to ensure proposed use of money in effective manner to raise the returns to 
economy and to itself.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
statistically same. This strengthens our suggestion that Nominal GDP growth rate can be used as benchmark for 
pricing of Islamic financial instruments as the data on nominal income growth rate and official policy rate are 
statistically found to be generated from the distributions with same mean and variance.  
9 Slope of the yield curve itself is based upon expected future economic performance. So it is better to link price of 
the financial instruments directly to the future expected nominal income growth rate.  
10 Real GDP growth rates turn negative during recession but this is rare for nominal GDP growth rate. But still one 
can ask what to do when nominal GDP growth is going to be negative. The suggestion is to benchmark the pricing 
of Islamic financial instruments to zero for assets side. On the liabilities side Islamic financial institutions can ask 
for service charges from the deposit holder as has been suggested in the literature while discussing deflation 
management in late 1990s in Japan.  
11 Though issues pertaining to nominal income targeting as monetary policy regime in Islamic countries can be 
addressed in a different research study which is out of scope of this paper but nominal income targeting will also 
be useful in balancing the role of central bank as conservative one and as pro- growth. 
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Another question can be, is it similar to indexation to inflation?  The answer is no. 
Inflation is subjective measure compared to income growth rates. Our proposal 
includes real income factor in addition to the inflation (compensation). 
 
An important aspect of proposal in this study is that it can be used in solving issues in 
external debt management of countries ready to operate their economies on Islamic 
economics principles even if the lending/borrowing country/institution is operating 
under capitalistic structure. Take example of International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
IMF provides lending to member countries for dealing with balance of payments 
crisis and to maintain stability in the economy in the form of Stand-By Arrangements 
(SBA), Flexible Credit Line (FCL), Emergency Assistance (EA), Exogenous Shocks 
Facility (ESF) and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), etc. If these loans 
are in IMF’s reserve currency, i.e., SDR which is composed of a basket of currencies 
namely USD, JPY, GBP and Euro; the financing facility so provided can be 
benchmarked using nominal GDP growth rate of the lender’s country of origin or 
benchmarked with weighted nominal GDP growth rate in major donor countries. The 
weight of the member countries’ currencies in SDR can be used as weights for 
calculating the weighted average nominal income growth. This is an example and 
various kinds of international transactions can be benchmarked in this manner12. 
 
Similarly, financing in development projects from World Bank and International 
Development Association (IDA) can also be benchmarked with weighted Nominal 
GDP growth rate in major donor countries. This will be an alternative for interest 
based financing. For soft loans the nominal GDP growth rate in the recipient country 
can be linked (like at the rate of one-fourth of nominal GDP growth rate).  
 
5. Monetary Management in Islamic Financial Environment  
 
Central banks in countries with Islamic financial environment should follow nominal 
income targeting as policy regime by characterizing monetary policy as nominal 
income growth reaction function. Nominal income growth is to respond with differing 
intensity to deviation of inflation from target inflation and to deviation of real output 
from zero. We proposed above (expected) annual NGDPGR to be used as benchmark 
for Islamic finance products of assets side and NGDPGR less cost of deposit 
mobilisation to be used as benchmark for products on liabilities side. In between these 
two rates have to be the rate (like 90% of expected nominal income growth rate) at 
which banks should be able to place their surplus funds and one such area is financing 
the government deficits. When it comes to financing government deficit this should 
                                                 
12 Better way is to link with the nominal income growth in recipient country. On one hand, it may involve issues 
pertaining to convincing the lender; on the other hand, it will create a corporate management reason to oversee the 
loan utilization by the recipient for intended use for better performance of recipient economy. In this case there are 
also issues pertaining to the currency in which transaction is going to be negotiated.   
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only be for public sector development projects approved by a (government) Shariah 
Body, like Islamic Ideology council in Pakistan, that these projects will be used for 
permitted (by Islam) economic activities (ensuring no other conventional financing is 
mixed in such projects). In case government is not in need of funds and IFIs has 
surplus funds to place, central bank should suck such funds (at the rate at which 
government should have taken the funds in case of her needs). At the time of needs of 
liquidity IFIs should be able to utilize central bank’s windows to borrow money at 
expected nominal income growth rate for short term. In case government is in need of 
financing Shariah approved projects, and there is no surplus funds with IFIs, central 
bank should decide to fully/partially finance (at the rate at which IFIs should have 
financed in case they had surplus funds) the project(s) depending upon overall 
monetary (policy) management in the country in the light of nominal income growth 
reaction function.   
  
6. Conclusion & Recommendations  
 
There has been a rapid growth in the Islamic financial transactions, particularly, 
during the recent past. Parallel to this growth some efforts have been made to devise a 
mechanism for managing liquidity in Islamic financial market. But little attention has 
been paid to the issue of establishing a benchmark for pricing Islamic financial 
instruments. This non-existence of a distinct and standardized benchmark has created 
obstacles in the creation and growth of more preferable Islamic alternatives. Central 
banks in countries where Islamic finance is growing are using interest rate as major 
policy instrument. So the need is, not only to think of an acceptable (to Shariah 
scholars and practicable in the presence of competition from conventional financial 
instruments in the market) benchmark for pricing the Islamic financial instruments 
but also to look into policy regime under which central banks are operating. 
Combining two ideas, one from conventional economics and other from Islamic 
economics literature this study contributes in proposing a benchmark for Islamic 
finance industry usable for pricing Islamic finance products and in pricing 
instruments for public finance, the trading in which will create a source of public 
finance by replacing conventional OMO through providing a base instrument in 
OMO in Islamic monetary framework. Based on a simple visual and statistical 
exercise we suggest that nominal income growth rate can be used as benchmark for 
pricing Islamic financial instrument. For conventional economist it is an indicator 
which moves almost together with the conventional official policy rate. For Shariah 
scholars in Islamic finance it is based upon actual economic activity. Based upon 
similar observation for a large number of countries it is proposed that the nominal 
GDP growth rate can also be used as benchmark for the price of loans to/from the rest 
of the world including bilateral/multilateral and institutional arrangements. Pricing 
the international financial transactions in this manner can solve problems faced by 
countries in external debt management under Islamic finance principals. The paper 
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also suggests central banks to use nominal income targeting and provides a liquidity 
management mechanism for banking system in Islamic financial environment.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Results of the test of equality of means- Null Hypothesis: Means are equal 
 
Country Period of 
Analysis 
NGDGR OPIN
R 
t-value p-value Results 
Canada, EU, 
Japan, US &  
UK 
1970 2008 7.53 7.51 0.02 0.98 
Not Rejected 
100 countries 1981 2008 11.01 10.25 1.47 0.15 Not Rejected 
Bahrain 1986 2008 7.59 5.37 1.14 0.26 Not Rejected 
Bangladesh 1987 2008 10.32 7.10 4.51 0.00 Rejected 
Egypt 1977 2007 16.78 9.60 5.61 0.00 Rejected 
Indonesia 1990 2008 19.36 14.92 1.23 0.23 Not Rejected 
Jordan 1986 2007 8.56 7.01 1.33 0.20 Not Rejected 
Kuwait 1987 2008 12.39 6.23 1.16 0.26 Not Rejected 
Malaysia 1986 2008 10.48 4.76 4.33 0.00 Rejected 
Oman 1986 2007 7.51 6.59 0.41 0.69 Not Rejected 
Pakistan 1986 2008 14.54 11.67 2.17 0.04 Rejected 
Saudi Arabia 1987 2008 9.27 5.10 2.01 0.06 Not Rejected 
Sudan 1989 2006 57.21 51.33 0.36 0.72 Not Rejected 
Yemen 1996 2008 21.02 15.51 1.44 0.17 Not Rejected 
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Table 2: List of 100 countries included in the average official interest rate and 
average nominal GDP growth rate 
S. No. Country  S. No. Country  S. No. Country  
1 Algeria 35 Fiji 69 Norway 
2 Anguilla 36 Finland 70 Oman 
3 Antigua & Barbuda 37 France 71 Pakistan 
4 Aruba 38 Germany 72 Papua N Guinea 
5 Australia 39 Greece 73 Paraguay 
6 Austria 40 Grenada 74 Philippines 
7 Azerbaijan 41 Guinea-Bissau 75 Portugal 
8 Bahamas 42 Hungary 76 Qatar 
9 Bangladesh 43 Iceland 77 Rwanda 
10 Barbados 44 India 78 Senegal 
11 Belgium 45 Ireland 79 Seychelles 
12 Belize 46 Italy 80 Slovak Republic 
13 Benin 47 Japan 81 South Africa 
14 Botswana 48 Jordan 82 Spain 
15 Burkina Faso 49 Kenya 83 Sri Lanka 
16 Burundi 50 Korea 84 St Kitts & Nevis 
17 Cameroon 51 Lesotho 85 St Lucia 
18 Canada 52 Libya 86 St Vincent/Grens 
19 Central African Republic 53 Lithuania 87 Swaziland 
20 Chad 54 Malawi 88 Sweden 
21 China, PR: Hong Kong 55 Malaysia 89 Switzerland 
22 China, PR: Mainland 56 Maldives 90 Syria 
23 Colombia 57 Mali 91 Tanzania 
24 Congo 58 Malta 92 Thailand 
25 Costa Rica 59 Mauritania 93 Togo 
26 Cote d'Ivoire 60 Mauritius 94 Trin/Tobago 
27 Croatia 61 Montserrat 95 Tunisia 
28 Cyprus 62 Morocco 96 U.K 
29 Czech Republic 63 Myanmar 97 U.S 
30 Denmark 64 Namibia 98 Vanuatu 
31 Dominica 65 Nepal 99 Vietnam 
32 Ecuador 66 Netherlands 100 Yemen 
33 Egypt 67 New Zealand     
34 Ethiopia 68 Niger     
   
 
